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The Global and the Local: Reconciling 









A review of Human Rights and Global Diversity edited by 
Simon Caney and Peter Jones. Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co., 




Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice by Monique 
Deveaux. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. 205 pp. 
 
 
Liberal models of human rights often exalt the individual at the expense of the group. The focus 
on the equality of individuals jeopardizes the well being of cultural groups that sometimes require 
different, rather than equal, protection. The problem of preserving minority cultural identities 
assumes special importance in light of global transfers of information, capital, goods, and people, 
and the potential of these globalizing forces to destroy attachments to “local” cultural values. 
Human Rights and Global Diversity, a collection of essays edited by Simon Caney and Peter Jones, 
and Monique Deveaux’s Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice, examine the difficulty of 
protecting cultural groups within the framework of universal human rights, while additionally 
acknowledging the unique and often fragile nature of cultural traditions. 
The collection of essays found in Human Rights and Global Diversity grew out of a colloquium 
concerned with “the development of norms that are global in scope, and recognition and concern 
for the diversity of culture, belief and value to be found among humanity.” (p. 1) In attempting to 
promote both respect for global norms and local cultures, though, we often work at cross-purposes. 
The authors in this volume attempt to reconcile these two ends in such a way as to protect both the 
universality of human rights and dignity and a reasonable diversity of human culture.  
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Balancing Cultural Norms and Universal Principles: The Threat of Cultural Relativism 
The pursuit of these twin goals presents a special challenge in light of the danger cultural 
relativism poses to the protection of human rights. Cultural relativists reject the application of 
universal human rights standards, which they frequently characterize as reflecting Western 
imperialism, and that they claim conflict with cultural beliefs or principles. In seeking to protect the 
sanctity of these cultural beliefs and principles, particularly in cases of genuine conflicts between 
culturally-mandated practices and human rights practices, we may risk compromising the integrity of 
global human rights standards. Yet rights to participate in the cultural life of one’s community1 and 
to self-determination of peoples2 are also regarded as human rights. The conundrum that emerges is 
how to preserve cultural norms and beliefs while protecting the universally recognized human rights 
of those individuals who compose cultural groups. 
Several of the authors in Human Rights and Global Diversity address the question of how to 
reconcile global human rights standards and local cultural norms. Peter Jones attempts such 
reconciliation by focusing on freedom of belief in his contribution, “Human Rights and Diverse 
Cultures: Continuity of Discontinuity?” Some liberal scholars accept only comprehensive liberalism, 
which emphasizes the equality of individuals. Against this position, Jones defends the idea of diverse 
ethical perspectives, which may justify rights on some basis other than individual equality or may 
impose social responsibilities along with individual rights. Jones advocates respect for diversity of 
human opinion by respecting the right of each individual to freedom of belief. This two level 
approach separates individuals from their beliefs. While promising, this approach leaves some 
significant questions unaddressed, including the problem of intolerant beliefs. To tolerate beliefs 
indiscriminately based on the right of the holder to believe them, Jones asks us to tolerate the beliefs 
of those who would deny those rights to others. 
At least some of the conflicts between cultural beliefs and universal human rights are illusory. In 
“Human Rights, Compatibility and Diverse Cultures,” Simon Caney examines different types of 
relationships between cultural values and universal human rights. He correctly points out that many 
culturally based beliefs do not actually come into direct conflict with international human rights 
principles. Rather, the two enjoy some degree of compatibility. Caney articulates several types of 
relationships between human rights and ethical traditions, including: 
v Incompatibility, in which human rights norms prohibit actions required by the ethical 
tradition in question; 
v Compatibility, where ethical traditions require actions that are compatible with human rights 
standards; 
v Convergence, where human rights norms and ethical traditions require the same actions, but 
for different reasons; 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
2 See common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
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v Identity, when both human rights and ethical traditions require the same conduct for similar 
reasons, though the reasoning may be expressed differently, 
v Apparent incompatibility, when ethical traditions and human rights seem to prescribe 
different conduct, but these differences arise because of different circumstances, and  
v Potential compatibility/convergence/identity, which arises when certain elements of ethical 
traditions can be developed in ways that support respect for human rights.  
Only in the case of incompatibility does an actual conflict exist. In the other instances, human 
rights and ethical traditions are at least potentially compatible. Caney demonstrates his argument 
with a case study of one non-Western ethical tradition, Theravada Buddhism.  
Caney contends that the Buddhist conception of well-being coincides with liberal conceptions of 
human rights. First, Buddhists believe that people can only bring fulfillment to themselves, and 
second, they emphasize emancipation. Though these ideas differ from Western liberal ideas about 
human rights, these values are not incompatible with human rights. Caney does not contend that 
Buddhist values compel respect for human rights, merely that they allow it. Still, the convergence 
between Buddhism and human rights possesses special significance because human rights are often 
criticized as being alien to traditional non-Western values. The compatibility of human rights and 
Buddhist principles provides concrete evidence against such claims and avenues for promoting 
individual human rights in culturally-sensitive ways.  
Deveaux also addresses the question of balancing universal norms and cultural rights in Cultural 
Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Deveaux sees the polarization between cultural practice and 
universal norms as stemming from the fundamental inability to incorporate cultural difference into 
prevailing theories of liberal thought. Surveying models of toleration, neutrality, liberal 
perfectionism, and deliberative democracy, she rejects these models in favor of her own version of 
deliberative liberalism. 
While political theory tends to treat cultural diversity as a problem to be overcome, Deveaux 
seeks to fully integrate this diversity into a model of democracy that embraces difference. Before 
proposing her own model of deliberative liberalism, Deveaux surveys dominant models of liberalism 
and their resolution of the problems posed by cultural diversity. The first of these, political 
liberalism, sharply divides public and private life, segregating political and cultural life. This school of 
thought, as illustrated in the work of John Rawls,3 conceives of people as individual citizens rather 
than as members of cultural groups. These citizens make decisions and advance their interests based 
on public reason. Such a model leaves no room for reasoning based on cultural values or beliefs. 
Political liberals, then, propose toleration as the model for dealing with cultural groups. Deveaux 
contemplates toleration as very limited, stating that tolerance implies “refraining from interfering 
with, and/or extending a kind of permission to, practices or beliefs with which they disagree.” 
(Deveaux, p. 43) She rejects toleration as inadequate in favor of a more robust model of respect for 
culturally diverse groups, as discussed more fully below. 
                                                 
3 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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Liberal perfectionism, exemplified by the writing of Joseph Raz,4 shares political liberalism’s 
view of cultural minorities as individual citizens who shed their cultural differences when entering 
the political sphere. Unlike political liberals who remain neutral among different conceptions of the 
good, liberal perfectionists take account of their particular view of the good, including values such as 
personal autonomy. While this commitment to personal autonomy seems a promising mechanism 
for the protection of cultural diversity, Deveaux ultimately rejects liberal perfectionism as well. 
Liberal perfectionists condition their support for cultural diversity on the culture’s support for 
individuals and their pursuit of the good life. Deveaux rejects this selective endorsement of cultures, 
arguing that some cultural minorities restrict individual freedom in the name of preserving nonliberal 
cultural norms as well as, in some cases, the existence of the minority group itself. 
The model of deliberative democracy, based largely on the writings on Jurgen Habermas,5 offers 
the greatest potential for incorporating cultural minorities, according to Deveaux. Unlike social 
contract theories, which rely on assumed consent, deliberative democracy requires actual consent 
arising out of discourse among individuals with differing interests, needs, and values. Nevertheless, 
Deveaux argues that deliberative democracy, while offering the potential to incorporate the values 
and needs of cultural minorities, still has some shortcomings. Discourse ethics still perceive 
participants as individuals and not as members of cultural minorities. Deveaux proposes to amend 
discourse ethics to include some individuals in a representative capacity in her alternative model, 
deliberative liberalism, which is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Protecting Cultural Groups 
In the presence of global norms, minority cultural groups often face actual physical extinction in 
addition to potential destruction of their norms, beliefs and values. Different approaches to 
preventing this destruction exist at the global and national levels. The authors of these two books 
discuss several of these various approaches. 
Chris Brown’s contribution to Human Rights and Global Diversity, “Cosmopolitanism, World 
Citizenship and Global Civil Society,” rejects the existence of a global civil society, which is often 
touted as a more hospitable framework for the preservation of minority cultural identities. While 
these groups often find themselves marginalized in states, a global civil society could provide 
repressed minorities with an alternative source of human rights protection and political participation. 
Despite this promise, Brown argues that it is only within the North Atlantic community 
(coterminous with membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) where a true 
transnational civil society exists. Other areas of the world lack the strong states that a global civil 
society requires. Rather than attempting to construct a global civil society, the more appropriate 
course of action at this point lies in a renewed focus on state-building. Once strong states emerge, a 
global civil society can follow. 
International mechanisms for protecting human rights must inevitably favor individuals or 
groups. In “The Pendulum Theory of Individual, Communal and Minority Rights,” Tom Hadden 
                                                 
4 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
5 Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). 
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argues that the emphasis shifts between these two poles. Prior to the creation of the League of 
Nations, individual rights predominated, as exhibited by the American Bill of Rights and the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man. With the creation of the League of Nations and the minority 
rights guarantees that accompanied it, the pendulum swung toward the rights of cultural groups. The 
pendulum would later swing back toward individual rights with the creation of the United Nations 
(UN) and the flurry of human rights lawmaking that ensued. More recently, group rights have again 
reasserted themselves as the UN and the European Union have acted to protect cultural minorities. 
While declining to select an optimal point on the pendulum swing, Hadden emphasizes that an 
understanding of the pendulum’s cyclical motion is essential to the effective protection of both 
individual and group rights. He likens human rights advocates’ need to understand and manage these 
swings to economists’ need to understand business cycles. 
As a right of peoples rather than of individuals, the right to self-determination presents special 
challenges to balancing the rights of individuals with the rights of the national groups to which those 
individuals belong. Nationalism—the desire of groups for self-rule based on feelings of 
community—comprehends a wide variety of political arrangements, some of which inhibit 
individual liberty by prescribing practices of values inconsistent with liberal human rights. Kimberly 
Hutchings addresses these challenges from mainstream cosmopolitan, communitarian and post-
positivist theories in “The Question of Self-Determination and its Implications for Normative 
International Theory.” Liberals and communitarians remain deadlocked ontologically, as liberal 
theorists tend to privilege the individual over the nation and, more specifically, the use of individuals 
as a means to an end. Support of liberals for nationalism derives from and relies on the nation’s 
support for individual autonomy. Nationalism based on non-liberal, or anti-liberal, ideas about 
individual rights are therefore objectionable to liberal nationalists. Communitarians invert this 
relationship, arguing that the group right to nationalism sometimes takes priority over the rights of 
the individual.   
Hutchings argues that critical theory, post-modernism, and feminism offer potential resolutions 
of this conflict. While favoring the Kantian ideal of the autonomous individual as an end in him or 
herself, critical theory challenges the conception of both the state and the nation as they appear in 
liberal and communitarian theory. Critical theory departs from liberal nationalism by its faith in the 
ability of individuals to transcend their particular identities through universal principles. While 
acknowledging that national identities constitute individuals, critical theorists reject this identity as 
exclusive. Rejecting knowledge outside of discourse, post-modernism raises an even more 
fundamental challenge and questions the existence of objective identities for both individuals and 
groups. Post-modernists challenge the constructs of states and nations as well as individuals, denying 
the existence of selves outside of discourse that would be entitled to self-determination. The 
identities of these selves, along with the obligations they owe to one another, are constructed out of 
discourse. Feminism presents a more complex case due to the various strands of feminist theory. In 
general, however, feminism generally addresses the overlay of gendered power relations on the 
tension between national and individual rights. Post-positivism thus challenges mainstream theory’s 
conceptions of the possible subjects of self-determination, while informing us that “self-
determination” also determines others to varying degrees. 
In the final essay of Human Rights and Global Diversity, “Humanitarian Vigilantes or Legal 
Entrepreneurs: Enforcing Human Rights in International Society,” Nicholas Wheeler examines a 
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specific example of intervention to protect a cultural group: NATO’s military intervention in 
Kosovo. NATO intervened to protect minority Albanians in Kosovo from the more dominant Serb 
ethnic group. Wheeler presents three models of humanitarian intervention: the posse, in which 
individual states act with U.N. Security Council authorization; the vigilante, which acts without 
authorization to enforce agreed-upon international norms, and the norm entrepreneur, which seeks to 
advance new norms. Ultimately, Wheeler asserts that NATO acted as a vigilante in Kosovo. While 
lacking specific authorization from the Security Council, which most legal scholars believe is legally 
required for humanitarian intervention, NATO was enforcing resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council. This vigilantism may have set a dangerous precedent for states taking the law into their own 
hands and will likely engender caution in the adoption of future principles. 
While Wheeler has created models of international action to protect minority groups, Deveaux 
focuses instead on internal arrangements that might better protect cultural minorities and their 
values. Deveaux’s model of deliberative liberalism differs from deliberative democracy by expanding 
the range of considerations beyond public reason. Cultural beliefs should play a role in discourse and 
public decision-making, though those same beliefs may prohibit the disclosure of these reasons. For 
example, indigenous cultures may believe that discussing their beliefs with others outside of their 
group is prohibited. Incorporating these cultural beliefs may mean abandoning deliberative 
democracy’s requirement of strong consensus. Deveaux proposes replacing strong consensus with a 
weaker version of consensus that requires all to have a chance to present their concerns but does not 
require unanimity. Some minority groups, by virtue of their numbers and, perhaps, their unpopular 
ideas, could become “permanent minorities,” effectively deprived of representation. Deveaux 
suggests that this problem could be rectified through altering representation or bargaining 
techniques. Deliberative liberalism would also recognize that some citizens possess diminished 
capacity for participation in discourse that leaves them marginalized vis-à-vis other groups. Deveaux 
believes that these modifications to deliberative democracy will deepen liberalism’s appreciation for 
and integration of cultural diversity. 
 
Reconciling Conflicts 
Ultimately none of these proposals constitutes a satisfactory explanation of how to both enforce 
global human rights norms while preserving cultural beliefs in the event of a genuine conflict 
between the two. While the principles proposed by Deveaux and the contributors to Human Rights 
and Global Diversity provide useful frameworks for resolving apparent conflicts, they do little to 
address circumstances where a genuine conflict exists between what universal human rights 
standards require and what cultural norms demand. Ultimately, we must resolve these conflicts in 
favor of universal human rights standards. To do otherwise would deprive those standards of their 
universalism and undermine the rights and dignities of those members of the cultural groups.  
While cultural diversity undoubtedly contributes to the rich tapestry of our world, granting too 
much authority to cultural groups, particularly without discriminating between those that respect the 
human rights of their members and those that do not, risks sending us down the slippery slope of 
cultural relativism. Any global scheme for incorporating diversity and protecting cultural rights must 
include some safeguards for the protection of universal human rights. Cultural minorities must 
secure some measure of human rights for their members, and must provide some opportunity for 
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dissent. Certainly international human rights standards can be incorporated in a culturally-sensitive 
manner, and dissent—to the extent that it may bring about change—can play a vital role in the 
changes that cultures undergo over time. 
It may ultimately be impossible to incorporate complete cultural diversity within the framework 
of liberal governance. In the cases where a genuine conflict exists between cultural principles and 
liberalism, resolving the conflict in favor of liberalism errs in favor of individual freedom for the 
members of the cultural group in question. Resolving the conflict in this way therefore provides 
these individuals with the greatest possible range of rights and freedoms. Resolving conflicts in favor 
of the individual may also ultimately benefit the cultural group. Members who have the freedom to 
determine the course of their lives, but choose to adhere to cultural traditions, provide the most 
persuasive evidence for the legitimacy of those beliefs.  
 
Amy Eckert is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver. She 
is dissertating on Rawls’ Law of Peoples and issues of toleration. 
© 2002, Center On Rights Development. 
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